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.. as these are situated in communities of practice in tht United States? I < . l i h t~ rh:jn turning to school-like activities for confirmation and guidance about tile llalur;. of learning, that gaze ~~o u l d reverse the perspective from which ~:~:l-~r~l:rsl.~gists look outward from their culture onto another. 11 would draw c 8 r 1 {r-h::r i s known about learning in forms of apprenticeship in other cultures 18.1 ir3l::ilj?r learning in our own sociocultural, historically grounded world. Ldn: h ;I 7 lew in\lites a rethinking of the norion of learning, treating it as an c!!ii.rF!rl~ property of whole persons' legitimate peripheral participation in com-!~~~n i~i c s of practice. Such a view sees mind, culture, history, and the social r 4 , : : l d .:F interrelated processes that constitute each other, and intentionally --I sy1-11ld like IJ 1haA Jukn Levine. Lauwn Resnick, and Stephanie Teasley, the conveners of 111. :.r-::::~~::.cc on Socially Shared Cognition. ~O T the opporrunity to participate in the conference and blurs social scientists' divisions among component parts of persons, their activities, and the world. These strategies of inquiry-counterintuirive definitions of learning, reversed points of cultural view, and historical analysis of cognitive processes-are ways to move closer to an encompassing theory of personslearning while exploring the implications of a more general theory of socially situated activity.
This attempt to rethink learning in social, cultural, and historical terms has developed in response to many of the same issues that have led todiscussions of socially shared cognition in this volume. At the same time, I take issue with some work characterized in this w a y , for it either maintains overly simple boundaries between the individual (and thus the "cognitive") and some version of a world "out there," or turns to a radical constructivist vizw in which the world is (only) subjectively or intersubjectively constructed. Learning, it seems to me, is neither wholly subjective nor fully encompassed in social interaction, and it is not constituted separately from the social world (with its own structures and meanings) of which it is pan. This recommends a decentered view of the locus and meaning of learning, in which learning is recognized as a social phenomenon constituted in the experienced, lived-in world, through legitimate peripheral participation in ongoing social practice; the process of changing knowledgeable skill is subsumed in processes of changing identity in and through membership in a community of practitioners; and mastery is an organizational, relational characteristic of communities of practice.
Anthropological studies of apprenticeship offer possible alternative cultural points of view on social processes of learning and inspiration for counterintuitive conceprualizarions of such processes. Craft apprenticeship in West Africa and apprenticeship among Yucatec Mayan midwives, for example, are practices in which mastery comes about without didactic structuring and in such a fashion that knowledgeabIe skill is part of the construction of new identities of mastery in practice. Inquiring into the nature of such processes leads to questions about the socioculturai character of social re-producrion for both persons and communities of practice in contemporary American society. What are typical communities of practice? What and how do people learn as legitimate peripheral participants, and how is this arranged in the socially organized settings of everyday practice? What can we learn from examining contemporary social practice when it is conceived as a complex structure of interrelated processes of production and transformation of communicies and participants? Several peculiarities have emerged rather quickly in the pursuit of answers to these questions. There are highly valued forms of knowledgeable skill in this society for which learning is structured i n apprentice-like forms. Furthermore, once one begins to think in terms of legitimate peripheral participation in communities of practice, many other forms of socially organized activity become salient as sites of learning ( e . g . , Alcoholics Anonymous, one of the examples in the discussion that follows). But if one turns to formal, explicit: salient educational sites (schooling being rhe primary one, but rbe workplace being characterized in similarly urgent terms), it is difficult to identify communit~es of practice, widespread mastery, and traditions of centripetal participation leading to changing identities of mastery. This is, of course, too broad a generalization to stand on its own. The point here is lo sketch how a socially situated theory of learning reveals the problematic character 0.l the socialinstirutional arrangements of schools and workplaces that are intended to bring about learning in the world in which we live.
Why is learning problematic in the modem world? One possible response LO h i s question is suggested in the historical analysis of Marxist social theory concerning the alienated condition of contemporary life. In this late period of capitalism, widespread deep knowledgeability appears to be in short supply, especially in those settings that make the most self-conscious and vociferous demands for complex knowledgeable skill. Learning identities (in both senses) are embroiled in pervasive processes of commoditization. To commoditize labor, knowledge, and participation in communities of practice is to diminish possibilities for sustained development of identities of mastery. But if formally mandated forms of mastery are circumscribed, pzople, nonetheless, do learn and do come to have knowledgeably skilled identities of various sorts. Contemporary forms of learning often succeed in unmarked, unintended ways, and these forms of learning also require first recognition, then explanation. All these concerns indicate that we should not lose sight of the fact that institutional and individual successes and failures of learning are interdependent and are the product of the same historical processes.
In this chapter, I propose to consider learning not as a process of socially shared cognition that resulcs in the end in the internaliza~ion of knowledge by individuals, but as a process of becoming a member of a sustained community cf pr:iiticc. Developing an identity as a member of a communil.y and becoming L %~. . I H Ic.Jgtably skillful are part ofthe same process, with the former motivating! shaping, and giving meaning to the latter, which it subsumes. It IS difficult to move from peripheral to full participation in today's world (including workplaces and schools), thereby developing knowledgeably skilled identities. This is because the processes by which we divide and sell labor, which are ubiquitous in our way ofproducing goods and services (including "knowledge"), truncate both the movement from ptripheral to full participation and the scope of knowledgeable skill. Taken to an extreme, these processes separate identity from i n t e n d e d forms of knowledgeable practice. This view implies that learning and failure to learn are aspects of the same social-historical processes, and polnts to relationships between knowledgeability and identity as an importaat focus for research.
CULTURAL VlEWPOlNTS AND THEORlES OF LEARNING

Theories of Situated Experience
It seems useful to introduce the concept of siruated ocrivily by attempting to cla:r~) differences among its main theoretical variants. Indeed, the term has appc..r~-L! recendy with increasing Frequency and with rising confusion about its mean111 ; Much of the confusion may stem from the assumption that situated activity 1s cl single, unitary concept. However, situated activity is anything but a simple concept; it is a general theoreticai perspective that generates interconnected theones of perception, cognition, language, teaming, agency, the social world, and their i~i [ c~~~l . t t i o n s .
Furthermore, there appear to be at least three different genres of SIIJLI~LI approaches.
Probably the most common approach is what might be called a cogniriotz pl!rr view. According to this view. researchers have lor years analyzed the ind~b~c . l~~n l , internai business of cognitive processing, representations, memory. and pr~,blc.rr~ solving, and cognitive theory should now attend to other factors as well. P: . r tplc ?recess, represent, and remember in relation to each other and while located i~i a iocial world. Therefore, researchers should extend the scope of their intraindividual theory to include everyday activity and social interaction. For proponents of this view, social factors becomeconditions whose effects cn individual cognition are then explored. But cognition, if seen as the result of social processes, is not itself the subject of reconcepcualization in social terms. A proponent of this position is likely to argue that a person thinking alone in a forest is not engaged in social cognition.
The interpretive view locates situatedness in the use OF language and/or social interaction. Interpretivists argue that we live in a pluralistic world composed of individuals who have perspectivaily unique experience. This view stands in contrast to that of the first position, which postulates a fixed Cartesian external world in which words have fixed referential meaning and in which rational agents (e.g., "scientists" or "expens"), devoid (ideally) of feeling or interests, are engaged in linear communication of "infomation" without integral relations of power and control (Rommetveit, 1987) . In the interpretive view: meaning is negotiated, the use of language is a social activity rather than a matter of individual transmission of information, and situated cognition is always interest-relative. F;.~lings and concerns are one important means by which situations are disamb~~u a t e d and given structure, rather than being [he source of distortions of rational tkil.bught. Ln this position there is no world independent of agents' construction of it-thus the emphasis on the constant negoriation and "reregistration" of "IliL. situation." Situatedness here is not equated with physical locatedness in the world. in places, settings, or environments. It is not possible to walk into a situation.
Instead, language use and, tbus, meaning are situated in interested, intersubjectively negotiated social interaction. This is different from the constraining physical view of context of most cognitivists.
Rornmetveit proposes thar the cognition plus and interpretive positions, heretofore dsagreeing with each other adamantly, are converging. They are brought together, he argues, by cognitive scientists and artificial inrelligence researchers who are adopting a henneneutic view of situated meaning. The emphasis of several chapters in this volume on language and on socially shared cognition as negotiated meaning supports his proposal. But the two views of situated activity are also brought together by their thorough bracketing off of the social world as an object of study. Such compartmentalization, whether practical or theoretical in intent, has the effect of negating the possibility that subjects are fundamenrally constitured in their relations with and activities in that world. This bracketing leads proponents of a third position, that of theories of social practice, to argue that the cognition plus and interpretive genres of situation theory are not really about situated activity because each offers only partial specification of key analytic units and questions needed to define situated activity.
The third view, which 1 will call situated social practice (and, where appropriate, situated learrzing), shares several tenets with the interpretive theory of situations. This theoretical view emphasizes the relational interdependency of agent and world, activity, meaning, cognilion, learning, and knowing. It emphasizes the inherently socially negotiated quality of meaning and the interested, concerned character of the thought and action of persons engaged in activity. But, unlike the first two approaches, this view also claims that learning, thinking, and knowing are relations among people engaged in activity in, with, and arisingfrom the socialIy and culturally structured world. This ulorld is itself socially constituted. Thus, from this point of view, "nature" is as much socially generated as afternoon tea. And its generation, according to this perspective, takes place in dialectical relations between the social world and persons engaged in activity; together these produce and re-produce both world and persons in activity. Knowledge of the social world is always socially mediated and open-ended. Its meaning to given actors, its furnishings, and the relations of humans with and within it are produced, reproduced. and changed in the course of activity (which includes speech and thought, but cannot be reduced to one or the other). The idea of situatedness in theories of practice further differs from each of the other two approaches in insisling that cognition and communication, in and with the social world, are situated in the historical development of ongoing activity. Thus it is also a critical theory, because the social scientist's practice must be analyzed in the same historical, situated terms as any other practice under investigation. This third position si~uates learning in social practice in the lived-in world; the problem is to translate this view into a specific analytic approach to learning.
Learning as Legitimate Peripheral Participation: Yucatec
Mayan Midwifery
Suppose there is not a strict boundary between the intra-and extracranial aspects o f human experience, but rather reciprocal, recursive, and transformed partial incorporations of person and world in each other within in a complex field of relations between them. This assumption follows if wc concei\:e of learners as whole persons, in activity within the world, and it leads to a distinctive description of learning: Legitimate peripheral participation offers a two-way bridge between the development of knowledgeable skill and identity-the production of personsand the production and reproduction of communities of practice. Newcomers become oldtimers through a social process of increasingly centripetal participation, which depends on legitimate access to ongoing community pracrice. Newcomers develop a changing undersranding of practice over time from improvised opportunities ro participate peripherally in ongoing activities of the communirp. Knowlc~ltrc.:~hle skill is encompassed in the process of assuming an identity as a practitioner, (-11 b~t..~rning a full participant, an oldtimer.
'[-he terms used here-oldrimerrlnewcome,-s: full participants. legitimate j!t~r:,~J:t*ral participants (but not teachel-slpupiis, or experrslnovices)-result from ;I k.~..i~;h For a way to talk about social relations in which persons and practices ~I-I,III;!(., re-produce, and transfom each other. The terms master and apprentice. 2%. [ h c~ are used here, are not intendtd as a disguise for teacher-pupil relations: .\l;l:lc.rs usually do not have a direct, didactic impacr on apprentices' learning activity, although they are often crucial in providing newcomers to a community with legitimate access to its practices.
Ethnographic studies of apprenticeship learning converge on a series of claims. This seems especially encouraging considering the diversity of forms of apprenticeship reported by anthropologists who have undertaken such research. Ethnographic studies in Mexico (Jordan, 1989) , West Africa (Goody, 1982; Lave, 1953) , and Hong Kong (Cooper, 1980) , and accounts of craft apprenticeship in East Africa (King, 19771 , among others, show that apprenticeship occurs in the context of a variety of forms of production (Goody, 1982) . Processes of learning are given form in ongoing practice in ways in which teaching is not centrally implicated. Evaluation of apprentices' progress is intrinsic to their participation in ongoing work practices. Hence, apprenticeship usually involves no external tests and Iictle praise or blame, progress being visible to the learner and others in the process of work itself. The organization of space and coordination among participants or, more generally, access for the apprentice to ongoing work and participation in that work are important conditions For learning.
Reanalysis of these cases as instances of learning through legitimate peripheral participation leads 10 somewhat different conclusions (Lave & Wenger. 1991) . One difference of interpretation is particularly relevant here: The process of becoming a full practitioner through increasingly intense, interconnected, and 'knowledgeably-skilled" participation, on the one hand, and the organization of processes of work, on the other hand, do not generally coincide at levels at which activity is intentionally organized. 11 follows that learners' perspectives on work will be different, and their comprehension of the practice will change across the process of learning. The changing relationship of newcomers to ongoing activity and to other practitioners-obviously much more complicated than there is space to discuss here-calls into question the assumption that modes of transmission of knowledge determine the level of generality of what oldtimers understand.
Attempts to compare schooling and apprenticeship have led to some notably converging analyses (e.g., Becker. 1972; see also Geer, 1972; Jordan, 1989; Lave & Wenger, 1991) . Becker. for example, recognizes that learning-in-practice is a widely dismbuted and ubiquitous feature of contemporary life. He observes that apprentice learners are surrounded by the characteristic activities of their trade.
Apprentices have the opportunity to see community pracrice in its complexity early on and have a broader idea of what it is about than just the particular tasks in which they are engaged or that are most easily observable. This appears to be central to processes of learning in apprenticeship. Becker goes on to suggest that, as a consequence of the accessibility of the full round of activities, the apprentice makes her or his own curriculum; apprenliceshlp thus provides an individualized and realistic learning setting.
Becker also argues that there are two grave difficulties that impede learning in apprenticeship. He believes apprenticeship is flawed in that teaching resources are scarce and must be recruited at the initiative of the individual apprentice. 1 disapee with this argument and will return to i r shortly. The other difficulty has to do with sh-ucturd constraints in work organizations on apprentices' access to the full range of activities of the job and, hence. ro possibilities for truly mastering a trade. He draws on a compelling example, a study of butchers' apprentices in a union-sponsored combined trade scl~nal!on-the-job training program (Marshall, 1972) . Marshall describes a seriously ineffective program, in which, among other things,
The supermarket manager sees to it that his skilled journeymen can prepare a large volume of meat efficienrly by specializing in,short, repetitive tasks. He puts apprentices where they can work for him most efficiently. working at the meal wrapping machine. But the wrapping machine is in a different room from the cold room where the journeymen prepare cuts of meat.
In our terms, the butchers' apprentices are ltgitimate participants in the butchers' community of practice bul do nor have access as peripheral parlicipants to the work of meatcutting. Economics, efficiency, control over the intcnsiry and uniformity of labor, segregation of interrelated activitizs in space and time, the politics of knowledge control-among orher characteristics of the organization of work-can diminish or enhance access, the cumculum, and the general understanding of on-the-job learners.
Forms of apprenticeship vary in the ways and in the degree to which they involve the exploitation o f apprentices as sources of free or cheap labor. The institution of apprenticeship in European and American history has a deservedly ugly reputation as a mechanism for recruiting, con~olling, and exploiting the labor of children and other newcomers. It is further implicated in the reproduction of structured inequalities of social class In those Western European countries where it is part of state educatjonal systems today. In other historical circumstances (especially those in recent African h~story in which apprenticeship has been virtually ignored as an instrumenr of stare policy, and where its local developments h a v t a long history of their own), it appears not to have generated sufficiently inequitable power relations between apprentices and those wich the economic and cultural capital to sponsor them to permit the growth of the exploitative practices often found where powerful mercantile and industrial forms of capitalist production dominate. Thus, the practices of indeniuring, virtual slave labor, and exploitation of children characteristic of apprenticeship in some historical contexts are by no means me of all. The evidence from West Africa, Yucatan, and elsewhere strongly suggests that such exploitation is not a necessary integral aspect of the conditions for learning to labor through apprenticeship. At the same time, where apprenticeship is an exploitative form of labor, this is a characteristic of whatever learning is going on, not merely an exogenous or irrelevant "factor" in the learning setting.
Jordan (1989) has carried out extensive field research on Yucatec Mayan midwives whose apprenticeship is quite different-more effective and less exploitive-than that of the butchers in Marshall's study. These apprentices are peripheral participants, legitimate participants, and legitimately peripheral to the practice of midwifery. They have access to both broad knowledgeability about the practice o r midwifery and to increasing participation in [hat practice. It is worth noting that it would be difficult to find evidence that teaching is the mode of knowledge "transmission" among the midwives. According to Jordan, Apprenticeship happens as a way of, and in the course of. daily life. It may not be recognized as a reaching effort at all. A Maya girl who eventually becomes a midwife most likely has a mother or grandmother who i s a midwife, since midwifery is handed down in family lines. . . . Girls in such families, without being identified as apprentice midwives, absorb the essence of midwifery practice as well as specific knowledge about many procedures, simply in the process of growing up. They know what the life of a midwife is like (for examplc, that she needs to go out at all hours of the day or night), what kinds of srories the women and men who come to consult her tell, what kinds of herbs and other remedies need to be collected. and the like. As young children they might be sitting quietly in a comer as their mother administers a prenatal massage; they would hear sro-ries of difficult cases, of miraculous outcomes, and the like. As they grow older. they may be passing messages. running errands, getting needed supplies. A young girl might be present as her mother stops for a postpartum visir after the daily shopping trip to [he market. Eventually, after she has had a child herself, she might come along to a birth, perhaps because her ailing grandmother needs someone to walk with, and thus find herself doing for the woman in labor what other women had done for her when she gave birlh; thar is, she may take a turn . . . a1 supporting [he laboring woman. . . . Eventually, she may even adminisrer prenatal massages to selected clients. At some point, she may decide rhar she actually wants to do this kind of work. She then pays more anention. bul only rarely does she ask questions. Her mentor sees thejr association primarily as one that is of some use to her ("Rosa alr~ady knows how to do a massage, so I can send her if I am too busy"). As time goes on, the apprentice rakes over more and more of the work load, starting with the routine and tedious pans, and ending with what is in Yucatan the culturally most significant, the birth of the placenta. '
Jordan has described a situation in which learning is given structure and shape through peripheral panicipation in ongoing acriviry. Learning activity is improvised in practice; some of its goals are clear to learners early in the apprent iceship.
But these claims are subject to Becker's concern that lack of in~entional guidance and instruction makes learning difficult if not impossible. My disagreerntnr with this point grows out of a recognition that there are resources other than teaching through which newcomers grow into oldtimers' knowledge and skill.
Thtse rtsources are ro be found in at least two aspects of apprenticeship. One is thr existence of a broad view of what is to be learned from the very beginning.
Broad exposure to ongoing practice, such as that described for the midwives' apprentices, is in effect a demonstration of the goals toward which newcomers expect, and are expected, to move. The other is the notion that knowledge and skill develop in the process-and as an integral part of the process-of becoming like master practitioners within a community of practice. This more inclusive process of generating identities is both a result of and motivation for participation.
It is through this process that common, shared, knowlcdgcable skill gets organized. although no onz specifically sets out to inculcate it uniformly into a group of learners. It is rarely the case that individual apprentices must take the init~atjve in gening someone to teach them in order to learn in circumstances where ongoing everyday activity provides structuring resources for learning. Gradually increasing participation in chat practice. and a whole host of relations with the activities of In short, investigations of situated learning focus attention on ways in which the increasing participation of newcomers in ongoing practice shapes their gradual transformation into oldtimers. Newcomers furnished with comprehensive goals, an initial view of the whole, improvising within the multiply structured field of mature practice with near peers and exemplars of mature practice-these are characteristic of communities of practice that re-produce themselves successfully.
ldentity in Participation: Alcoholics Anonymous
The descr-ipcjon of Yucatec apprenticeship in midwifery provides a sense of how learning in practice takes place and what it means to move coward full participation in a community of practice. A more detailed view of the way in which the fashioning of iden~ity is Lhe means through which members become full participants, and how this subsumes the kind of knowledge and skill usually assumed to be the goal of newcomers' activity. may be found by analyzing the process of becoming a nondrinking alcol~olic through AIcoholics Anonymous (AA).
It may seem unusual to characterize AA as a leaming environment. But this characterization follows from the view of learning as legitimate peripheral participation in communiries of practice. Indeed. analyzing communities of practice as sites of learning is one of the most useful characteristics of a theory of socially situated activity. AA, then, constitutes a community of practice, one in which newcomers gradually develop identities as nondrinking alcoholics. Cain (1991) argues that, in leaming not to drink, The change these men and women have undergone is much more than a change in behavior. Lt is a transformation of their identities, from drinking non-alcoholics to non-drinking aicoholics, and it affects how they v~ew and act in the world. . . . By "ident~ty" I mean the way a person understands and views himself, and is viewed by others, a perception of self that IS fa~rly constant.. . . (pp 210, 212) As a culrural system, and one that no one is born into, all of the beliefs of AA must be Learned. The propos~tions and interpretauons of events and experiences, the appropriate behaviors and values of an AA alcoholic, and the appropriate placement of the alcoholic identity in the hierarchy of identities one holds must be learned. i n short, the AA identity must be acquired. and its moral and aesthetic distinctions internalized. This cultural information is transmitted through the AA literaiure, and through talk in AA meetings and in one-to-one interacrions. One imponant vehicle for this is [he personal story. (p. 21 5 ) Situating Leamlrrg New members of AA begin by attending meetings at which oldtimers give testimony about their drinking past and the course of the process of becoming sober. The contribution of an absolutely new mtmber may be no more than one silent gesture-picking up a white chip at he end of the meeting to indicate the intenlion not to take a dnnk during the next 24 hours. Oldtimers map have told polished, hour-long stories. months and years in rhe making, of their lives as alcoholics. Cain argues that the main business of AA is the reconstruction of identity, through the process of construction of these life stories, and with them, the meaning of the teller's past and future action in the world.
An apprentice AA member attending several meetings a week spends that time in the company of near peers and adepts and, in the testimony at early meetings, has access to a comprehensive view of what the communiry is about. There are also clear models for constructing AA life stories in published accounts of drinkers' lives and in the storytelling performances of oldtimers. Goals are also made plain in the litany of the 12 Steps to sobriety, which guides the process of moving from peripheral to full participation jn AA. Early on, newcomers leam to preface their contributions w i h the simple identifying statement "l'm an alcoholic" and, shody. b inboduce themselves and sketch the problems that brought them co AA. They k g i n by describing these events in non-AA terms, Their accounts are counlcred with exemplary stories by more experienced members who do not criticize or c m c t newcomers directly. Newcomers gradually generate a view that matches more closely the AA model, eventually producing skilled testimony in puhlic meetings and gaining validation from others as they demonstrate appropriate understanding (Cain, 1991) . The "12th Step" visit to an active drinker to try to persuade that person to become a newcomer in the organization initiates a new phase of participation, now as a recognized oldtimer.
There seem to be two kinds of meetings in AA, general meetings and discussion meetings. The latter tend to focus on a single aspect of what in the end will be a part of the reconstructed life story (perhaps one of the 12 Steps): "admitting you arc powerless," "making amends:" or "how to avoid the first drinky (Cain, 1991) . These discussions have a dual purpose. Participants engage in the work of staying sober and, through this work, in the gradual construction of an identity. The notion of partial participation in segments of work that increase in complexity and scope (also a theme in Jordan's analysis) describes the changing form of participation in .4A for newcomzrs as they gradually become oldtimers. In due course, those who move centripetally into full participation become increasingly good at not drinking, at making amends, at ceconslructing their lives in terms of AA, at constructing AA stories, and at telling such stories-some of the knowledgeable skills subsumed in becoming a nondrinking alcoholic.
The Yucatec midwives' apprenticeship and Alcoholics Anonymous both seem straightforward in the sense that learners have access to the everyday activity involved in being and becoming members. There do not appear to be devastating structural barriers in the practice of midwifery or in belonging to AA that prevznt newcomers from gradually becoming oldtimers themselves. Given that part of the activity an organization must engage in to survive is the organization of its own reproduction, structural barriers to learning cannor be the only relevant organizational forces at work. No rational organization can exempr the production of oldtimers from its agenda of crucial structural arrangements, and giving learners access to full participation is a condition for meeting this goal. Nonetheless, the ideas sketched here so far paint too clean and consistent a picture of learning activity, in several respects.
HlSTORlCAL ANALYSIS, COMMUNITIES, AND COGNlTlON
Communities of Practice and Processes of Learning
1 began with the proposition that participation as members of a community of practice shapes newcomers' identities and in the process gives structure and meaning to knowledgeable skill. I have treated [his process as a seamless whole. But there are ~tbiquitous structural discontinuities in learning processes. Learning in any setting is a complex business that to some extent involves irreducibly contradictory interests for the parricipants. This is as m e of Yucatec midwifery and AA as of every other community of practice. The process of becoming a full practitioner in a community of practice involves two kinds of production: the production of continuity with, and the displacement of, the practice of oldtimers (Lave & Wenger, 1991) . Newcomers and oldtimers are dependent on each other: newcomers in order to learn, and oldtimers in order to c a n y on the community of practice. At the same time, the success of both new and old members depends on the eventual replacement of oldtimers by newcomers-become-oldtimers themselves. The tensions this introduces into processes of learning are fundamental. This proposition does not put an end to the relations of production of learning. The construction of practitioners' identities is a collective enterprise and is only partly a matter of an individual's sense of seIf, biography, and substance. The construction of identity is also a way of speaking of the community's constitution of itself through the activity of its practitioners. It further involves a recognition and validation by other participants of the changing practice of newcornersbecome-oldtimers. Most of all, without participation with others, there may be no basis for lived identity. This conception of learning activity draws attention to the complex ways in which persons and communities of practice constitute themselves and each other.
Marxist sociologists have explored just such relations of incorporation bemeen persons and communities of practice, viewed as processes of subjectij5cation and objectijicarion, and have tried to grapple wirh their paiticular character in contemporary society. Analysis begins with the most basic structural principles shaping this society. Persons, and their participation in cornmunitjes of practice, are grounded in the contradiction associated with commoditization of production. The products of human labor are rumed into commodities when they cease to be made for the value of their use in the lives of their makers and are produced in order to exchange them, to serve the interests and purposes of others without direct reference to the lives of their makers. As such, the results of labor are removed further and further from their common place in the lives of the laboring people who produce them in exchange for money in an anonymous global market, i~~r~n ! . i i~s d still further when the iabor that goes into making th~ngs suffers the \Arii:.
::,Ie.
Iommoditization places people between the pincers of two systematically 1n:zrrcisted aspects of the concept of alienation. One is the anthropomorphizing ~-~i ilbirst~ as they become central forms of connectedness between people. The UUIGI ;s the objectification of persons as they take on exchange value as sources of labor power (e.g., an ''A" student, wage labor "employees"). These concepts provide a useful focus for the present discussion because they pertain to a level of belief and action in the world at which participation, the fashioning of identity, and skillful knowledgeability are configured in practice. The first concept (fttishizing, anthropomorphizing) relfects the fact that, as a consequence of stmcturing relations among the products of human activity in [ e m s o i exchange value, w t have come-mistakenly-to
give objects (in all senses of that word) the properties of power, intention, and aclion that rightly belong only to whole human agents in communities. An anthropologisr's (WMO) interview with the director of international advertising for Coca-Cola (MM) provides a vivid example of this phenomenon:
WMO: There's a pl~r~s: th;it 3ilniclinc.: passes in the academic community-" l ' t s a -i t , l~~~u~s r~t~r~" of the world-which I'm sure you've heard before. Not only have qualities of human agency been attributed to products such as Coca-Cola, but knowledgeable skill (e.g., expertise, IQ) has been endowed with separate and lively properties independent of the communities of which knowledge is a distributed, integral dimension.
The other aspect of alienation follows from the cornmoditization of labor through the selling and buying of the labor power of human beings (wage labor) who having sold their labor power, no longer rum their hands primarily to fashioning the solutions to their own needs. Alienation in this sense involves the idea of separation-of the abstraction or extraction of central forms of life participation (e.g., work, knowing, or doing sorneth~ng skillfully) from the human lives that really produce them, thus mistakenly giving human agents properhes of objects. In particular, this implies that human activiry becomes a means rather than an end in itself; people become hired hands or enzploy-res rather than masters of their own productive activities.
These are powerful aspects of Western political economy and culture. They are relevant to a situated analysis of relations between the development of knowledgeable skill and the construction of identity, membership, and communities of practice, although, so far, 1 have treated membership and knowledgeability in unified terms as "mastery" or full participation. The conception of an oidtimer as a master practitioner does not reflect the ways in which the consb-uction of identity and knowledgeable skill are characteristically shaped and misshapen when alienation-the efects of objectifying human beings and anthropomorphizing objects-prevails.
Part of what gives the notion of mastery its seamless connotations is that it unites the identity of master with skilled knowledgeability. Apprenticeship thus seems to escape from the effects of commoditization. In the world today, however, much of human activity is based on the division of and selling of labor for a wage. Having a price has changed indelibly the common meaning of labor. The agent has little possibility of fashioning an identity that implies mastery, for commoditization of labor implies the detachment of the value of labor from the person. In such circumstancr.;, the value of skill, transformed into an abstract labor power, is excised horn the consbuction of personal identity. If becoming a master is not possible in such circumstmces, the value accruing to knowledgeable skill when it is subsumed in the identiq of mastery devolves eisewhere or disappears. This analysis places the concept of learning-in-practice i n jeopardy. On the one hand. it appears that conditions for learning in contemporary society limit the possibiljty of mastery to just those forms of activity that continue 10 be associated with apprentice forms of Icxning-for example, in graduate programs in universiries and in the practice of medicine, law, and the arts. On the other hand, I have argued that learning occurs under just the circumstances where the fashioning of identity and che gradual mastery of knowledgeable skill are part of an ~nlr-rrdl process of participation. How can h i s be?
The Workplace and School
In the contemporary world, both Yucatec midwifery and Alcoholics Anonymous lie outside the world of schooling, workplaces, and marketplaces (although they are no1 immune to their effects, e.g., Jordan, 1989). To take seriously the assumption that the contemporary social world can be described in the terms just proposed, involving the alienation of knowledgeable skill from the construction of idcntit)l. it might be useful to examine settings in which these effects are, arguably, most concentrated: contemporary workplaces and schools. Two principles emerge from this exercise. concerning relations belween communities of practice on the one hand and tbe broader situatedness of such communities in a social formation as a whole on the other hand. The first principle is the prevalence of negatively valued identities (e.g., "We're just Loggers" or "We don't know real math"). and the second is the ad hoc, interstitial nature of communities of practice in which identities are formed and sustained knowledgeability is made possible.
Let us consider each principle in turn. First, the working out of relations of commodification and, thus, alienation shape experience and interpretations of experience and contribute to the creation of devalued or negatively valued identities. Commodification and alienation also contribute to the devaluation ofperso/zs' knowledgeable skill by comparison with the reified value of knowledge as a commodity. Second, structural conslraints 011 (rather than within) communities of practice arc important in the production of negative valuation of being and doing. That is, occupational and production-line specialization and other strategies for conuolling-by dividing-work and workers narrow the possibilities for what may be learned (and. with them, the significance of membership) to an absurd minimum. The value of mastery in a community of practice diminishes if the prlccc5s i j P ~entripetal participation is correspondingly limited or extinguished. The .s.:~tur. 1 b 1 Iising an oldtirner may be reduced to whatever value there is in having E $I" .,l,cl .. in a given setting over a long period of time.
Where the scope of h e ongoing activities of a communit)~ of practjce is in close approximation to levels of human organization at which coherent, meaningful participation in activity is possible, as among the midwives and nondrinking alcoholics, conditions and resources for centripetal participation and eventual mastery are available. But there is a paradox here. It is exactly in those organizations in which control through the narrowing, trivialization. and decomposition of full participation is most common-in schools and workplaces-that learning is most often an institutional motive and yet, by the argument here, most likely to fail. On the other hand, conditions for learning flourish in the interstices of family life, in the participation of children in becoming normal adults (Fortes, 1938; Goody, 1989) , in professions that have not yet been specialized out of intelligibility, in officially neglected areas of cultural production (e. g . , Alcoholics Anonymous, rock music), in sports, and so on. And legitimate peripheral panicaument ipation also has a place in sites of wage labor, although it follows from the ar, abou~ commodification that communities of practice are unlikely to exist there in formally defined ways.
Indeed, communities of practice in workplaces and schools are mostly ad hoc. Ln the workplace, people who are members of work groups in formal terms often form sustained but disjunctive communities of practice, a s in the shop floor culture described by Willis (1977) . These communities shape the ways in which work and play are produced, their meaning, and the skilled, stylized relations among oldtimers to which newcomers aspire-in short, forms of mastery. These communities of practice alone do not account for the organization of everyday activity in work settings, of course, but strongly shape the social practice of work, nonetheless. Although the specific mechanisms are different, the decomposition of activity to the point of meaninglessness and the formation of informal communities of practice are to be found in schools as well as in the workplace. Standardization of curricula and examinations, evaluation through grading, the deskilling of teaching ( Apple, 1979) , relations between the decomposition of school knowledge by teachers and their conaol over students in classrooms (McNeil, 1986) , and forms of student stratification and classification in schools all serve to reduce the meaning and even the possibility of engaging as a peripheral participant in knowledgeably skilled activity in the classroom. Furthermore. children form ad hoc cornrnunities of practice mostly outside the classroom (e.g., Willis. 1977). Becker (1972) hints at this when he says that children in school learn best what the school does not teach. "Burnouts" and "jocks" are more likely to exemplify mastery in a community of practice than are solid geometry students (Eckert, 1989) . There are even interstitial communities of practice in classrooms, where, for example, newcomers generate distinctions between "real, valued knowledge" and what they themselves do, and consequently consider themselves inadequate even many (competent) years later (Lave, 1988) .
In short, when official channels offer only possibilities to participate in institutionally mandated forms of commodit~zed activity, genuine participation, rnemhrship, and legitimate access to ongoing practice-of a practice considered ivnflhy d~h e name-are rare. At the same time, schools and school-like workplace educational enterprises accord knowledgeable skill a reified existence, turning it into something to be "acquired" and its transmission into an jnstitutionai motive.
This process generates pressures toward rhe trivializing decomposition of f o m s of activity. The result is a widespread generadon of negative identities and misrecognized or institut~onally disapproved interstitial cnrnmunities of practice.
lnternalizafion and Learning Transfer: A Situated Critique
At chis point, 1 would like to reconsider ~wofundamenral questions in contemporary &enrjzjng about learning. These questions are generally conceptualized in ways that suffer from the same overly simplistic character of my initial notion of mastery.
1111e1-~ializarion is the cognition plus approach's answer to the question of how the social world and the individual come to have a good deal in common. This view of learning as ingestion (with teaching as feeding) is undergoing modification.
This volume demonstrates the importance of social interaction, the joint construction uC meaning, the dtstributed character of knowing, and, hence, the parrial, transfnmcd, situated nature of that wl.lich is taken in. Bur internalization might also hc cnnceived of as the sum or, perhaps bttter, the structure of relations of su~jectification and ob.jectification of a human agent. According to this view, in~emslization must take historically and culturally specific forms. The transformatiarts involved in these processes guarantee that a "srraight pipe" metaphor of knnu~ledge channeled inro learners cannot be a reasonable ulay of cl~aracterizing that highly complex and problematic process.
Leal-ning transfer is meant to explain how it is possible for there to be some general economy of knowledge so that humans are not chained to the particularities of literal existence. Tbt vision of social exisrence implied by the notion of transfer, which accompanies equally colloquial notions of internalization treats life's situations as so many unconnected lily pads. This view reduces the organization of everyday practice to the question o i how i t is possible to hop from one lily pad to the next and still bring knowledge to bear on the fly, so to speak.
Two arguments have been developed that recommend against this vision of social life. The first is a very general proposit-ion, reflected in anthropology's holistic approach (and in notions like that of a "social formation" or -'social system"), that the structure of the social world as a whole is borh constituted and reflected in the structures of its regions, insritutions, and situations, so that they srf neither isolated horn one another nor composed of unconnected retations. The
hjslnrical pesenl addressed here offers an especially eloquent example: If communilics nf practice are located interstitially in institutional settings (both schools 31-16 workplaces) thar prescribe their own versions of organization and proper practice, then most people are engaged in complexly interconnected ' 'situa~ions" for extended portions of their everyday lives. Willis (1977) uses the notion of double articillatiori to describe meaning and action in the lives of working class lads, in the informal group of the school and in shop floor culture in the workplace.
Thus, the lads' everyday practice in school is both a reaction against the institutional practices of the school and an elaboration of working-class family, street, and shop floor culture in the \~l i 0 0 1 setting.
Second, the same stru~:r~lral principles that generate limited institutional possibilities for forming wor,h ~dentities. that t~ansform producrive activity into nonspecific labor for a l . b~g c . ~n d that generate characteristic distortions in che objectification and subjci:ific..:lil\n of persons, activity, and world in practice, also generate characteristic tl'lr I : I~ * p i ~nterconnectednsss among situated practices (e.g., between shop floor and . i . l~r w > l ~ounterculture). These, in turn, surely contribute to characteristic forms ~-!f ~~upr~:,v:sed knowing and doing around these articulations.
The alternalive offered by a llicory of situated learning to static situations and nongenerarive reified vic.1.v.; 1.1t' knowledge begins with the claim that. in practice, structure and experiecic. !agsrhcr-generate each other. In so doing they constitute characteristic subslanlive r e l a r~l .~~~s among persons acting, settings, situations, systems of activity, and institu;ll~ns. Such relations of articulation are culturally, historically specific; they arc.. .irguably, key signatures of particular social formations. They include chai-:rc:;.ristic processes through which persons' understanding in practice changes.
CONCLUSION
1 began this chapter by laying out several theoretical approaches to situated activity. I have eschewed the cognition plus view on grounds that anyone starting from a cognitivist position must come face-to-face, sooner or later, with the difficulty of treating either cognitive processes or featurss of situations as situated entities when their analytic meaning is predicated on a radical disjunction berween them. My disagreement with the interpretive view is perhaps less obvious. An awlysis of structure is basic to the argument abouc commodification: There are structuring relations between the scope of participation (and potential mastery) in communities and the production of that scope in relations of commodification and the characteristics of divided forms of labor; there are structuring relations between institutional social arrangements and the conjunctive and disjunctive characrer of communities of practice therein. I doubt that ei~her of these structuring relations is recoverable solely through the analysis of interested negotiated meaning in social interaction.
The main pan ofthjs chapter explored ways in which communities of practice and cultural processes of identity construction shape each other. Along the way, 1 sketched a series of conceptual interdependencies among person, ac~ivity, knowledge, and world that recommend a conception of learning as "legilimale peripheral participation in communities of practice." I argued that relations between subjects and objects in the world are shaped by their cultural and historical circumstances in processes that involve the subjectification of objects and the objectification of persons, and that often generate negative identities and ad hoc communities of practice. Such a vieup offers a means with which to replace an unproblematic notion of cultural transmission/internalization with a historically situated analysis of relations among activity, the social world, and persons in pract~ce. Objectifying persons and the personalizing of commodities are situated principles of thought and interpretation. as well as structural principles in the formation of communities of practice.
This analysis of learning as situa~ed social practice suggests a number of I~I I . : : I~. I .
1.esearch questions, beginning with the interrelations of communities of I~:;l;rl..; and the formation of valued identities of mastery through legitimate ~'~:.!ldli.:-al participation. Such questions revolve around issues of legitimate access, LIZ i;ll:ilictual conditions for mastery, and, thus, the form and location of communities of practice. The object of leaming surely becomes full, strongly valued participation and deeply transformed forms of understanding. How can we address learning phenomena of such extended scope? 11 would be useful to inquire more deeply into the double and multiple art~culations of ongoing activity in given situations and to explore various forms of lension and conflict over continuity and displacement in different communities of practice. It also seems useful to inquire into salient identities from the points of view of members themselves, and lo ask what learning cuniculum is afforded by the legitimate participation that makes it :r:.~::.:li!,-for newcomers to become oldtimers in a gillen setting. That is, there is ;1 s r c .~t deal to be learned about communities of practice and the community's 1.1:1;4 lc~lgeable skill in schools and workplaces that cannot be learned if institu-I 11-81 l ; r l L~oundarjes and programs are assumed to define the lived character of social practice.
This suggests more specific questions about cumcula of practice. What are the characteristics of communities of practice that m a k broad accessibili~y to the whole steadily available to newcomers? I have claimed in passing that changing -tl:tinnr ilf nzrr-cmers to work processes, as learners move centripetally toward ~L I I p:~rlliip:~~lill~. make possible a changing understanding of the community's . . .hlea~-!!~cr r;!;l:li~n~ ;re;n to facilitate sharing of knowledgeable skill; how is this pos5:hic.. :I~.~::II I L~I I C~ I r rilcan in hislo:ic-;~lly ;rnd iul:ursll> specific terms, and how is il r. ~i!ii~*cl;Lr~.d 11-1 PI tbcch:;es of becnr.i:l:_c a 1-ul l ?r;~c.!:lil.n;.r? Both transformations of undc ri1;hlicl I I;L' incl i:::ltlons with prcr5 T;LILC LI:I;.>I l < l i l . -.:\)out the cycles by ulhich newcomers become oldtimers, who thereby become the community o f pracrtce for the nexr newcomers, cransforming their understanding as they transform [heir identities. Changed understanding is also forged (or not forged) in cycles of work. both long and short, and in relarions o f communities of practice to larger instirutional orders. T o underscand all of this would be to understand the structure of transformarions of knowledgeable skiil and identiry as well. Together, these qutstions recommend a close examination of ongoing social practice as the key [ Q underslanding situated learning.
